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Abstract 
Foreign and security policy were not areas in which Prime Minister Cameron was seeking to 
renegotiate the relationship between the UK and the European Union (EU) but security may be a 
key issue in the EU referendum. The XQWDQJOLQJRI%ULWDLQ¶VIRUHLJQDQGVHFXULW\SROLF\IURPWKH
EU following a Brexit vote would be relatively uncomplicated. 7KH (8¶V DUUDQJHPHQWV IRU
collective foreign and security policy, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and 
Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), are conducted on an intergovernmental basis 
which allows the UK to preserve independence in its diplomacy whilst allowing for the 
coordination of policy where interests are held in common with other member states. The UK 
retains substantial diplomatic and military capabilities which would allow it to continue to 
pursue a separate national foreign, security and defence policy, in the case of HLWKHUDµ/HDYH¶RU
µ5HPDLQ¶RXWFRPH  
 
















Security has already taken on a central role in the EU referendum debate. Prime Minister David 
Cameron has been keen to make a connection in the public mind between EU membership and 
national security, as indicated by speeches and statements that he has made since the opening of 
the formal stage of renegotiations on a new UK-EU relationship last autumn.1 The case for 
UHWDLQLQJPHPEHUVKLSDVWKHEHVWYHKLFOHIRUWKH8.¶VQDWLRQDOVHFXULW\KDVDOVREHHQVupported 
by key international figures, including President Obama and Jens Stoltenberg, NATO Secretary 
General, allowing remain campaigners to highlight how a Brexit might undermine other 
relationships central to UK national security.  
 
In his renegotiation of the terms of EU membership, Prime Minister Cameron did not mention 
EU foreign and security policies. This is already an area in which the UK is able to preserve 
autonomy uncomplicated by binding EU policy commitments that intrude on national foreign, 
security and defence policy. Consequently, the XQWDQJOLQJRI%ULWDLQ¶VIRUHLJQDQGVHFXULW\SROLF\
IURPWKH(8¶VCommon Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence 
Policy (CSDP) following a Brexit vote would be relatively uncomplicated. Further, it is an area in 
which the costs of a Brexit could fall more heavily on the EU than the UK, as the loss of a member 
state with significant diplomatic and military resources would diminish the collective capabilities 
at the disposal of EU foreign and defence policies.  
 
In what follows, it will be argued that security and defence is an area in which the impact of a 
vote to leave the EU would be relatively marginal. Because cooperation in this area is 
intergovernmental, disentangling the UK would be relatively straightforward. And because of the 




The UK LV DORQJVLGH )UDQFH RQH RI WKH (XURSHDQ 8QLRQ¶V WZR PRVW powerful and ambitious 
states when it comes to foreign and defence policies. The UK remains one of the globally 
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significant states. Its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was globally ranked 5th in 2014 by the IMF, 
after those of the US, China, Japan, and Germany. Even with the global financial crisis and the 
economic growth of the BRIC states (Brazil, Russia, India and China), the UK has the sixth 
highest  military expenditure after the US, China Russia, Saudi Arabia and France according to 
SIPRI. The UK hosts a major international financial centre in the City of London, the Pound 
Sterling is a major internationally traded currency and the UK hosts a major defence industry 
which makes the UK the 6th most important arms exporter according to SIPRI figures. 
 
Within the EU the UK is also RQHRIWKH(8¶VµELJ¶± alongside France and Germany ± by size of 
population and economy. It LVRQHRIWKH(8¶Vmajor diplomatic and military powers, accounting 
for, again according to SIPRI, 20.8% of the EU member states¶ total military expenditure, 
compared to 21.4% for France and 16% for Germany. (SIPRI, 2015) As one of the (8¶V WZR
permanent members of the UN Security Council, and also both a G8 and G20 member, it is at the 
centre of a number of internationally significant organisations. It is also a founding member of 
NATO and a nuclear state. The UK is the (8¶V ODUJHVW provider of overseas development 
assistance (ODA), and second only to the United States internationally, retaining its 
commitment of 0.7% of GDP expenditure despite austerity over the last 5 years. Britain also 
UHWDLQVRQHRI WKH(8PHPEHUVWDWHV¶PRVWH[WHQVLYHGLSORPDWLFQHWZRUNVZLWKVOLJKWO\ IHZHU
embassies than France and slightly more than Germany) and increasing the total number of its 
embassies in recent years. This is despite the creation of a diplomatic service for the EU that will 
be outlined below. The UK also possesses a network of soft power resources utilising its linguistic 
and cultural power through the Commonwealth and British Council.   
 
In recent years, British foreign and security policy has been confronted with a significant set of 
challenges. Broader structural shifts within international relations are taking place alongside 
considerable YRODWLOLW\ LQ WKH 8.¶V (XURSHDQ QHLJKERXUKRRG 0DQDJLQJ this change and 
FRPSOH[LW\DUHNH\FKDOOHQJHVIRUWKH8.¶Vforeign and security policy. This changing structure of 
international affairs - with the rise of new actors such as China and other BRICs - has combined 
with the recent global financial crisis (and its attendant austerity) to raise questions about the 
place of the UK in international relations.  
 
Over the last fLYH \HDUV %ULWDLQ¶V GLSlomacy and defence have become more financially 
constrained. 7KH8.¶VGHIHQFHEXGJHWKDVEHHQFXWLQUHDOWHUPVE\ and the foreign affairs 
budget by 16% (Chatham House, 2015).  Even with this difficult financial climate the British 
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Government has not looked to the EU or its member states to develop the pooling and sharing of 
diplomatic or defence resources. Reductions in spending on diplomacy have also been 
accompanied by a µQHWZRUN VKLIW¶ WR UHDOORFDWH WKH 8.
V GLSORPDWLF SRZHU WR WKH HPHUJLQJ
economies and rising countries, and reducing staff and closing diplomatic posts outside capital 
cities in Europe. Adding Brexit to this mix of challenges would generate yet more uncertainty.  
 
The EU in WKH8.¶VIRUHLJQDQGVHFXULW\SROLF\ 
7KH8.¶VDSSURDFKWRWKH development of a European foreign and security and defence policy has 
been broadly supportive of greater intergovernmental coordination of national foreign policies. 
It has also been resistant to the notion that UK foreign policy should be constrained by 
institutional or decision-making arrangements that would limit national foreign policy 
prerogatives.  
 
7KH8.¶Vmembership of the EU is a constituent part RI%ULWDLQ¶V national foreign and security 
SROLF\7KURXJKLWVPHPEHUVKLSRIWKH(8WKH8.LVDOVRDSDUWLFLSDQWLQWKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQ¶V
external relations policies, which encompass foreign policy, security, defence, trade and 
development. Consequently, the UK pursues a national foreign and security policy which seeks to 
DGYDQFH WKH 8.¶V RZQ QDWLRQDO LQWHUHVW ZKLOVW VLPXOWDQHRXVO\ FRQWULEXWLQJ ZLWK RWKHU (8
PHPEHU VWDWHV WR WKH SURFHVV RI PDNLQJ DQG LPSOHPHQWLQJ WKH (8¶V IRUHLJQ DQG VHFXULW\
policies. Therefore a decision to leave the EU, following the referendum vote in June 2016, would 
KDYHEURDGHULPSOLFDWLRQVIRU%ULWDLQ¶VSODFHZLWKLQLQWHUQDWLRQDOUHODWLRQV  
 
Understanding the 8.¶Vcurrent perspective on EU foreign and security policy requires a broader 
horizon to understand the adjustment that Britain has been making to its place in the world over 
the last seventy years. The UK has become a post-imperial power after embarking on a 
decolonisation process. Its geo-political footprint has progressively shrunk as it has lost direct 
control of overseas territory, reduced the size of its armed forces and shrunk its military bases 
overseas. An echo of the colonial period endures with the British Overseas Territories (BOTs) 
over which the UK still exercises sovereignty and through which it retains responsibility for 
places around the world as far flung as Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, islands in the 
Caribbean and the South Atlantic. It is also in possession of military bases across Europe, in 
Cyprus, Germany and Gibraltar. During the Cold War, Britain saw itself as a key European player 
but shifted from a country predominantly concerned about the global balance of power to a 
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country primarily focusing its security and defence policy on the North Atlantic area and the 
European continent, which was under Soviet threat.  
 
Alongside such major structural changes, there have also been some strong elements of 
continuity, most notably, in seeking to strike a balance between Europe and the United States. 
7KH 8.¶V µVSHFLDO UHODWLRQVKLS¶ ZLWK WKH 8QLWHG 6WDWHV - covering intelligence, defence and 
diplomatic cooperation - UHPDLQVDFHQWUDOFRPSRQHQWRI%ULWDLQ¶V IRUHLJQDQGVHFXULW\SROLF\ 
Since the early 1960s, Britain also sought to participate directly LQ (XURSH¶V political and 
economic integration project by seeking membership of the European Economic Community 
(EEC). The relationship between the US and European strands of UK foreign policy has also been 
at the heart of different visions RI%ULWDLQ¶VSODFHLQWKHZRUOG The point of departure for most 
GLVFXVVLRQVRQ%ULWDLQ¶Vinternational role post-Second World War KDVEHHQ:LQVWRQ&KXUFKLOO¶V
vision of the UK as a necessary part of three circles: the Community of Europe (seeing Britain as 
a part of Europe but not a participant in European integration); the Empire and the 
Commonwealth; and the Anglo sphere. The notion that Britain needs to re-balance these three 
circles has been stressed recently by advocates of a UK exit from the European Union. They 
stress the opportunities that exist through a reinvigoration of links with the Commonwealth and 
WKHµ$QJORVSKHUH¶. Successive British Governments have sought to retain a close relationship with 
the United States to preserve international influence. A less prominent strand of thinking has 
been that the UK needs to re-balance its relationship with the US by focusing on a deeper form of 
foreign policy cooperation within the EU.  
 
Even without a Brexit, the current and previous Conservative-led governments have sought to 
re-FDOLEUDWH%ULWDLQ¶VSODFH LQ WKHZRUOG to µde-FHQWUH¶ WKH(8 IURPWKH8.¶V IRUHLJQSROLF\. In 
response to the rise of emerging powers ± as well as to shifts in the global political economy 
giving a greater prominence to China and Asia - the UK government has placed greater emphasis 
RQ WKH 8. DV D µQHWZRUNHG¶ IRreign policy actor, for whom the EU is only one network of 
influence. The most recent strategy statements that guide UK Government¶V foreign, security and 
defence policy clearly demonstrate this position. The 2015 National Security Strategy (NSS) and 
Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) documents place the EU in a minor supporting 
role in WKH8.¶VGHIHQFHDQGVHFXULW\2 Similarly, the )RUHLJQDQG&RPPRQZHDOWK2IILFH¶VSingle 






As stated above, there are a QXPEHURIGLIIHUHQWVWUDQGVWRWKH(8¶VH[WHUQDOrelations. Each of 
these has different policy making arrangements and different forms of implementation. Foreign 
SROLF\ ZDV QRW D FRPSRQHQW RI WKH (8¶V IRXQGLQJ WUHDWLHV DQG RQO\ HPHUJHG Ds an informal 
process of collective consultation between member states in the early 1970s. This foreign policy 
consultation process was originally known as European Political Cooperation (EPC) and 
progressively developed with arrangements for decision making and implementation that were 
separate from the policies and practices developed under the European Community. 
 
Foreign policy coordination was revamped and made a constituent part of the European Union 
in 1993, with the coming into force of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). The CFSP has the 
purpose of coordinating the foreign policies of the member states. It remains different from other 
areas of EU policy as each member state has the ability to veto any collective decision, so policy 
making is normally described as intergovernmental, rather than based on the community 
method of decision making in which the European Commission proposes policy which is 
co-OHJLVODWHG E\ WKH &RXQFLO RI 0LQLVWHUV DQG WKH (XURSHDQ 3DUOLDPHQW 7KH (8¶V +LJK
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice President of the 
European Commission (HR/VP), currently Federica Mogherini, takes the lead in steering the 
(8¶VFROOHFWLYHIRUHLJQSROLF\RQEHKDOIRIWKHPHPEHUVWDWHVDQd coordinating this with the (8¶V
RWKHU µH[WHUQDODFWLRQ¶activity (as it is described in EU-speak), such as trade and development 
policy. To assist the HR/VP in her role there is the European External Action Service (EEAS). 
The EES is a diplomatic service populated by European civil servants and seconded national 
diplomats. Whilst based in Brussels, it operates a network of EU delegations (which enjoy a 
similar statusto embassies) in third countries.  
 
The Foreign Affairs Council (FAC), composed of member state¶ foreign (and sometimes 
development, defence and trade) ministers meets at least monthly to discuss and take decisions 
on common foreign policy positions, and to adopt measures, such as sanctions, to give effect to 
foreign policy decisions.4 The FAC is also responsible for taking decisions to launch crisis 
management activities under the Common Security and Defence Policy.  As well as chairing the 
)$& WKH+593UHSUHVHQWV WKH(8¶VFROOHFWLYH IRUHLJQSROLF\SRVLWLRQV WR WKLUGFRXQWULHVDQG
conducts diplomacy on behalf of the member states. These member states appoint ambassadors 
to a Political and Security Committee (PSC) (chaired by representatives from the EEAS) which 
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provide oversight of the day-to-GD\RSHUDWLRQVRIWKH(8¶VIRUHLJQVHFXULW\DQGGHIHQFHSolicies 
as well as providing policy options for consideration by the FAC.  
 
The &)63¶VDFKLHYHPHQWVWR-date remain rather modest and mixed as the European Council on 
Foreign Relations annual EU Foreign Policy Scorecard illustrates.5 Recent successes include the 
(8¶VSDUWLFLSDWLRQLQWKH,UDQQXFOHDUGLSORPDF\SURFHVVDQGEURNHULQJDJUHHPHQWEHWZHHQWKH
Kosovan and Serbian Governments to normalise their relations. Yet these must be set against 
less positive outcomes in Ukraine, Syria and Libya. 
 
British governments have been comfortable with the intergovernmental nature of the CFSP since 
its creation. Proposals to reform the CFSP - such as introducing qualified majority voting for 
decision-making - have been by successive British administrations irrespective of their political 
composition. Where reforms have been agreed to the CFSP under the Amsterdam, Nice and 
Lisbon Treaties, Britain has held a consistent position in preserving the central role and veto 
power of PHPEHUVWDWHVUHVLVWLQJWKHµFRPPXQLWL]DWLRQ¶RIWKH&)63E\NHHSLQJWKHEuropean 
Commission from assuming a leading role in initiating policy proposals, and seeking to improve 
the effectiveness of the CFSP via JUHDWHUXVHRIWKH(8¶VRZQILQDQFLDOUHVRXUFHVDQGSRZHUDVD
trading bloc. 
 
The British Government has assessed its own participation in the CFSP positively in the Review 
of the Balance of Competences exercise undertaken under the 2010-2015 Coalition 
Government.6 The foreign policy report summarised the expert evidence that it received with the 
DVVHVVPHQWWKDWLWLV³JHQHUDOO\VWURQJO\LQWKH8.¶VLQWHUHVWVWRZRUNWKURXJKWKH(8LQIRUHLJQ
SROLF\´,WDUJXHGWKDWseveral benefits accrue from the increased impact of acting in concert with 
27 other countries: greater influence over non-EU powers, derived from our position as a leading 
(8FRXQWU\ WKH LQWHUQDWLRQDOZHLJKWRI WKH(8¶V VLQJOHPDUNHW LQFOXGLQJ LWVSRZHU WRGHOLYHU
commercially beneficial trade agreements; the reach and magnitude of EU financial instruments, 
such as those IRUGHYHORSPHQWDQGHFRQRPLFSDUWQHUVKLSVWKHUDQJHDQGYHUVDWLOLW\RIWKH(8¶V
WRROV DV FRPSDUHG ZLWK RWKHU LQWHUQDWLRQDO RUJDQLVDWLRQV DQG WKH (8¶V SHUFHLYHG SROLWLFDO
neutrality, which enables it to act in some cases where other countries or international 
organisations might not.  
 
Most academics and analysts view the UK as an important player within the CFSP and as playing 
a positive role in seeking to build consensus on European foreign policy positions. The UK is also 
8 
 
viewed as a member state which is consistently resistant to any moves to restrict national 
autonomy in foreign policy making. It has been interested in reforms to EU foreign policy that 
would increase its visibility and coherence but does not accept the proposition that member 
VWDWHVVKRXOGFRQYHUJHRQDµVLQJOH¶IRUHLJQSROLF\WKDWZRXOGUHSODFHWKRVHRIWKHPHPEHUVWDWHV  
 
The UK and the CSDP 
The EU embarked on its own defence policy in the early 1990s when the member states 
collectively agreed to create a common defence policy. The CSDP, like the CFSP, is an area of 
LQWHUJRYHUQPHQWDO FRRSHUDWLRQ EHWZHHQ WKH (8¶V PHPEHU VWDWHV 7KH &6'3 KDV GLIferent 
ambitions and purposes from NATO. NATO provides for the collective defence of its members 
and brings the military capabilities of the United States together with twenty-seven other states 
into a transatlantic military alliance organised and prepared to fight military adversaries. In 
contrast, the CSDP focuses on preventing, managing and resolving conflict using both military 
and civilian resources. The range of roles that the EU and its member states seek to undertake 
collectively are known as the µPetersberg tasks¶. These roles include providing peace keeping 
forces, providing security for elections to take place in states in conflict, training police, armed 
forces and security personnel in third countries, and monitoring disputed borders, ceasefires and 
peace agreements. Since 2003, thirty missions have been launched in Africa, Asia, the Middle 
East, the Western Balkans, Eastern Europe and the Caucuses.7 The CSDP is also intended to 
enhance the collective capabilities of member state armed forces by coordinating military 
procurement and enhancing inter-operability by developing joint military forces capable of 
undertaking Petersberg missions. The CSDP relies upon the member states to commit their own 
forces voluntarily to the  operations as the EU does not possess a defence budget. British 
governments have, however, been more keen on building bilateral defence relationships (outside 
the EU framework) with France, Germany and Poland. 
 
The 8.FDQOD\FODLPWRDOHDGLQJUROHLQWKH&6'37KH(8¶Vambitions for a defence policy, set 
out in the Maastricht Treaty (TEU), were rather directionless until the 1998 Anglo-French 
summit in St Malo, where Tony Blair and Jacques Chirac agreed to a push for greater EU defence 
FDSDELOLWLHV$VWKH(8¶VWZRPRVWcapable military powers, the UK-French agreement laid the 
ground for what was to EHFDPHWKH(8¶V&RPPRQ6HFXULW\DQG'HIHQFH3ROLF\.  
 
Since this time, the UK has shifted from leader to laggard in terms of its support for the 




five-yearly Strategic Defence and Security Review made no reference to the CSDP as a 
component of tKH8.¶VDSSURDFKWRSURYLGLQJIRULWVQDWLRQDOVHFXULW\Dnd defence.  
 
Relative to its size the UK has been a very modest contributor to the military strand of the CSDP 
operations. It has generally had a preference for commitments through the framework of NATO. 
In contrast, it has FRPPLWWHGSHUVRQQHOWRWKHPDMRULW\RIWKH(8¶VµFLYLOLDQ¶PLVVLRQVGHSOR\HG
for roles such as border observation and capacity building for third countries. The civilian 
missions fit readily inWRWKH8.¶VGHYHORSPHQWRIWKHµFRPSUHKHQVLYHDSSURDFK¶WRLQWHUQDWLRQDO
conflict management, which brings together diplomacy, defence and development resources to 
address the problems of failed and failing states. Independent analysts credit the UK with 
VKDSLQJWKH(8¶VDJHQGDLQWKLVDUHD8  
 
The main priority for UK defence and security in recent years has been recalibrating strategic 
choices following the withdrawal of military forces from Iraq and Afghanistan. A key concern has 
DOVR EHHQ WKH 8.¶V FDSDFLW\ IRU GLSORPDWLF LQIOXHQFH DQG IRU influencing regional and 
international security in the context of diminishing public expenditure and the attendant 
shrinkage of diplomatic and military resources. There has also been a growing caution around 
overseas intervention due to public and elite scepticism and weariness. This has not, however, 
lead to a greater enthusiasm for burden sharing on defence or the pooling and sharing of military 
resources with other member states via the EU.  
 
The Prime Minister has attempted to set a new post-austerity dLUHFWLRQIRU%ULWDLQ¶VGHIHQFHZLWK
the announcement of major increases in the UK defence budget last autumn. This included an 
unambiguous commitment to maintain spending at 2 percent of GDP. This would increase the 
defence budget but would not fully reinstate cuts that have been made in recent years. The UK 
has made a number of major defence commitments, including renewal of the Trident nuclear 
weapon and submarine delivery system and two Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carriers to be 
equipped with new F-35B fighter jet aircraft. Yet none of these decisions have been made with 
reference to military roles that might be undertaken by the UK through the EU. The UK has 
resisted proposals to deepen further the institutionalisation of European defence by giving the 
(8¶VEuropean Defence Agency (EDA)  - established in 2004 with a brief to improve European 
defence capabilities in the field of crisis management - a greater role or budget. The UK has also 
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resisted the creation of a permanent military EU operational headquarters, an idea which is 
supported by a number of other EU member states including France and Germany.  
 
Overall, a YRWH IRU %UH[LW ZRXOG EH OHVV GLVUXSWLYH IRU WKH 8.¶V GHIHQFH SROLF\ WKDQ IRU RWKHU
DVSHFWV RI %ULWDLQ¶V (8 PHPEHUVKLS A Brexit ZRXOG KRZHYHU SODFH WKH 8.¶V PLOLWDU\
capabilities further from the EU and this is of especial relevance as the UK has tactical airlift and 
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities which are in short supply among the 
other member stateV ,QGLFDWLYH RI 8. DVVHWV PDGH DYDLODEOH WR WKH (8¶V &6'3 KDV EHHQ WKH
provision of the operational headquarters (ONQ) for the EUNAVFOR anti-piracy operation off 
the coast of Somalia. This may no longer be available WRWKH(8¶V&6'3, though ti is conceivable 
that a deal might be struck.   
 
EU membership and foreign, security and defence policy 
 
The argument that the (8LVDSRVLWLYHµQHWFRQWULEXWRU¶WRWKH8.¶VQDtional security has been 
advanced by the remain campaign. For Brexit campaigners, an exit from the EU would allow the 
UK freedom of choice to fully utilise its diplomatic and military capabilities alongside its soft 
power, its position as an unrivalled international financial centre and its memberships of the 
Anglosphere and the Commonwealth to seek new international influence, especially with rising 
powers. %UH[LWFDPSDLJQHUVKDYHDOUHDG\VRXJKWWRGRZQSOD\WKH(8¶VFRQWULEXWLRQWRWKH8.¶V
security by making the argument that it is NATO and the United States, not the EU, that has kept 
the peace in Europe since the Second World War. It also argues that EU defence policy has the 
ambition to create a µ(XURDUP\¶ to replace national militaries. 
 
A Brexit would, however, raise a broader set of questions for the UK. EU membership has been a 
NH\ FRPSRQHQW RI WKH 8.¶V GLSORPDF\ DQG IRUHLJQ SROLF\ VLQFH  $OWHUDWLRQ RI WKDW VWDWXV
ZRXOGUHTXLUHDQH[WHQVLYHUHFDOLEUDWLRQRIWKH8.¶VUHODWLRQVKLSZLWKLWV(XURSHDQQHLJKERXrs. 
Negotiating an exit from the EU itself would occupy extensive diplomatic and political 
bandwidth for an extended period (possibly for as long as a decade) which would then be 
unavailable to focus on the extensive and pressing set of security challenges currently faced by 
the UK. A key priority for British foreign policy for the two years following a Brexit vote would be 
WRQHJRWLDWHWKH8.¶VUHODWLRQVKLSZLWKWKH(8DVSURYLGHGIRUXQGHU$UWLFOHRIWKH7UHDW\RQ




The effects of Brexit would not be one-sided. The loss of one of the EU¶V³ELJ´ member states 
ZRXOGUDLVHTXHVWLRQVDERXWWKH(8¶VFDSDFLW\WRZHDWKHUWKHIXWXUH, coming on the heels of the 
Eurozone and migration crises. Non-European commentators would certainly question whether 
the EU was on the road to dissolution. 
 
Less dramatically, WKH8.¶VYRLFHDVDNH\SDUWLFLSDQWLQWKH(8¶Vcollective foreign policy would 
be lost. As a country with a significant track record in international engagement, and a range of 
diplomatic, mLOLWDU\ GHYHORSPHQW DQG RWKHU IRUHLJQ SROLF\ UHVRXUFHV WKH 8.¶V VXSSRUW RU
opposition, to the development of a collective system of EU foreign and security policy making, 
and the pursuit of foreign policy initiatives, has a high degree of importance. In turn, the UK 
would lose the capacity to multiply its national foreign policy objectives through the EU and the 
consequent power that it enjoys in each of these areas. 
 
UK bilateral relationships with other EU member states would be greatly complicated by a 
Brexit. The UK has invested particularly heavily in its relationship with France in recent years. 
The 2010 Lancaster House Treaties have created a new Anglo-French defence relationship 
rooted in collaboration on nuclear weapons technology and increased interoperability of armed 
forces. The Treaties are premised on closer cooperation between the UK and France to facilitate 
greater burden sharing in the EU and NATO. France has persisted with the idea of an 
Anglo-French coordination at the heart of a successful EU foreign, security and defence policy 
despite the reticence of recent British governments to develop an EU defence policy. With a UK 
EU exit, the rationale for even closer links between the UK and France would certainly diminish. 
 
The UK would also face a major complication in the key transatlantic pillar of its foreign policy 
relationship with the United States. President Obama and other Administration officials have 
already expressed a clear preference for the UK to remain within the EU. An EU departure would 
be placing the UK in a contrary position to that of the long term strategy of the United States. 
Both Democrat and Republican Administrations have supported and promoted EU and NATO 
enlargements as key tenets of Transatlantic relations over recent decades. Outside the EU, the 
UK would no longer have leverage on future enlargements of the EU or seeking to ensure that EU 
defence policies are developed in a manner that also strengthens NATO, rather than duplicates 
it,. This reduction in leverage would mean that the UK would most certainly be considered of 
diminished significance to future US administrations. The special relationship might no longer 





The UK retains a substantial set of diplomatic and military capabilities which allow it to continue 
to pursue a national foreign, security and defence policy separate and separable from its 
PHPEHUVKLS RI WKH (8 7KH (8¶V DUUDQJHPHQWV IRU FROOHFWLYH IRUHLJQ DQG VHFXULW\ SROLF\ WKH
CFSP and the CSDP, are conducted on an intergovernmental basis which allows the UK to 




DVRQHRIWKH(8¶VWZRPilitarily significant member states it has not sought to play a leading role 
in the development of a European Union defence policy. Britain has treated the CSDP as an 
optional extra for UK foreign, security and defence policy, rather than central or integral.  
 
7KHXQWDQJOLQJRI%ULWDLQ¶VIRUHLJQDQGVHFXULW\SROLF\IURPWKH(8¶V&)63DQG&6'3IROORZLQJD
Brexit vote would be relatively uncomplicated. The loss of a member state with the diplomatic 
and military resources of the UK would, however, diminish the capabilities that could be at the 
disposal of EU foreign and defence policy initiatives.  
 
The impact of Brexit RQWKH8.¶VEURDGHULQWHUQDWLRQDOVWDQGLQJis more difficult to gauge. There 
would also be the need to reconfiguUH %ULWDLQ¶V GLSORPDWLF UHODWLRQVKLS ZLWK WKH UHPDLQLQJ
member states if the UK was no longer a participant in the EU¶V collective multilateral 
decision-making. $VWKH8.¶VQHLJKERXU, WKH(8ZRXOGUHPDLQDFHQWUDOFRPSRQHQWRIWKH8.¶V
foreign and security policy after a Brexit. For the EU, the UK would have moved from being a 
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